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Abstract 
 
Real estate divestitures and acquisitions (D&A) are conducted as part of corporate restructuring. This 
study aims to fill the knowledge gap on abnormal stock market returns (AR) toward D&A activities 
during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in a developing country. Malaysian listed non-real estate 
companies that conducted D&A during the GFC are used as sample. Event study is applied to determine 
AR surrounding D&A announcements within (-10day, +10day) event window. Results for both D&A 
announcements shows insignificant AR on and around announcement date (-1 to +1). For pre-
announcement, divesting (acquiring) companies obtain negative (positive) AR, signifying that the market 
does not favor (favor) divestitures (acquisitions) due to leakage of information. The outcome of post-
announcement proves that divesting companies continue to experience negative ARs, although most 
divesting companies were paid premium prices. However, acquiring companies experience significant 
and negative post-announcement AR. This is probably due to the price premium which most acquiring 
companies paid exceeding valuation for their acquisitions. In summary, the market disapproves 
divestitures in general and acquisitions of real estate assets exceeding their valuations during economic 
recessions.   
 
Keywords: Divestiture; acquisition; real estate assets; economic recession 
 
Abstrak 
 
Pelucutan dan perolehan harta tanah (D&A) dilakukan sebagai sebahagian daripada penyusunan semula 
korporat. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengisi jurang pengetahuan mengenai pulangan pasaran saham yang 
tidak normal (AR) terhadap D&A aktiviti sepanjang tempoh kemelesetan ekonomi di negara membangun. 
Syarikat bukan hartanah Malaysia yang tersenarai yang mengendalikan D&A sewaktu krisis kewangan 
2008 digunakan sebagai sampel. Kajian Acara digunakan untuk menentukan AR sekitar pengumuman 
D&A dalam (-10day, +10day) tingkap acara. Keputusan untuk kedua-dua pengumuman D&A  
menunjukkan AR insignifiken pada dan sekitar tarikh pengumuman (-1 kepada +1). Untuk pra-
pengumuman, syarikat pelucutan (perolehan) mendapati AR negatif (positif), menandakan bahawa 
pasaran tidak memihak (memihak) pelucutan (perolehan) disebabkan kebocoran maklumat. Hasil selepas 
pengumuman membuktikan bahawa syarikat-syarikat pelucutan terus mengalami AR negatif, walaupun 
kebanyakan syarikat melupuskan telah dibayar harga premium. Walau bagaimanapun, syarikat-syarikat 
perolehan mengalami AR yang signifikan dan negatif selepas pengumuman. Ini mungkin kerana 
kebanyakan syarikat perolehan membayar premium melebihi penilaian untuk perolehan mereka. 
Ringkasan, pasaran tidak bersetuju akan pelucutan secara umum dan perolehan harta tanah melebihi 
penilaian dalam situasi kemelesetan ekonomi. 
 
Kata kunci: Pelucutan; perolehan; aset harta tanah; kemelesetan ekonomi 
 
© 2015 Penerbit UTM Press. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies execute real estate divestiture and acquisition (D&A) 
activities to restructure or reorganize to keep up with shifting 
economic environment.1 Specifically, D&A can be interpreted as 
a company’s adjustments of its ownership and business portfolio 
structure. The motives for D&A activities may vary contingent 
upon existing economic circumstance and therefore the 
announcements of similar activities may obtain differing market 
reaction on the companies’ share prices. This is particularly 
crucial in economic recessions as companies divest and acquire 
assets to urgently enhance their operating performance.2 There is 
very little evidence on market reactions for D&A activities by 
listed public companies in depths of recessions. In addition, 
72                                                     Janice YM Lee et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 73:5 (2015), 71–77 
 
 
previous empirical studies on the announcements of D&A 
activities are typically focused on the developed markets. 
  This study aims to contribute by examining market reaction 
towards D&A announcements during the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). Distinctively, this study deduces whether D&A 
announcements create wealth for the announcing company 
through abnormal market returns (AR) over a (-10day to +10day) 
event window around the announcement date. The recession 
period began from Q4 in 2008 to Q3 in 2009 are bounded with the 
Gross Domestic Product. Samples of Malaysian listed non-real 
estate companies that conduct D&A activities during the 2008 
financial crisis is used.  
 
 
2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Corporate Real Estate 
 
Real estate holds an essential capacity in a company as resources. 
Real estate is a prime asset that can be restructured in order to 
meet occupational, operational, development and investment 
requirement.3 This is because real estate is a noteworthy 
substantial asset for Malaysian listed non-real estate companies. 
  The selected 500 non-real estate companies in 2001 
collectively owned RM96.27billion, corresponding to 20.7% of 
the total market capitalization (RM465billion) of Bursa Malaysia 
and 24% of the total tangible assets of these companies.4 Asian 
non-real estate companies have higher real estate holding intensity 
(i.e. percentage of real estate held as total tangible assets) than 
their US and European counterparts, with numerous large 
corporations possess their own prestigious administrative 
headquarters in turn to intensify their corporate image.5  
 
2.2  Market Reaction to D&A Announcements 
 
Table 1 below summarizes recent studies conducted on AR from 
D&A activities. Majority studies do not categorize the underlying 
economic climate. 
 
Table 1  Empirical studies on assets divestitures and acquisitions 
 
Divestiture studies Acquisition studies 
Authors Event 
window 
Summary of Findings Authors Event 
window 
Summary of findings 
Glascock et al 
(1989) 
(-5, -1) The empirical evidence had shown a 
weak positive market reaction. 
Owers and 
Roger (1986) 
 (-1, 0) Ambiguous and inconclusive. Averagely, 
acquirer experienced positive ARs 
Ronald (1990) (0,0) Significant effect on AAR for overall 
sample 
Glascock et al. 
(1989) 
 (0, 0) No ARs for property acquirers 
Lasfer et al. 
(1996) 
(-1,0) Market reaction to sell-off 
announcements is positive 
Glascock et al. 
(1991)a 
 (0, 0) No significant ARs for property acquirer 
making multiple acquisitions except 
there are significant returns for a sub-
sample of sole property purchasers. 
Liow (1997) (0,0) Corporate creates significant positive 
value enhancement to property trades 
disposal announcements 
Booth et al. 
(1996) 
 (0, 0) No ARs for property acquirers 
Alexandrou 
and 
Sudarsanam 
(2001) a 
(-2, 0) Sell-offs announcements result in 
positive during recession period which 
generate larger wealth gains than 
those during economic boom. 
Ooi et al. 2002 (0,0) Significant positive grow linked with 
announcements of successful land 
acquisition 
Campbell et 
al. (2003) 
(0, 0) positive significant abnormal returns 
to sell-offs announcement 
Brounen and 
Eichholtz 
(2001) 
(0,0) positive share price reaction to the 
announcement 
Francis et al 
(2004) 
(0, +1) The study has shown positive 
abnormal return.  
Fu and Ching 
(2003) 
(0,0) Positive abnormal share price return 
subsequent to land acquisitions news for 
both economic booming and recession 
period 
Ting et al. 
(2006)a 
(+1, -1) Significant positive response for 
buoyant period and significant 
negative price effect during recession 
period. 
Ooi & Sirmans 
(2004) 
(0,0) No significant impact take place to whole 
real estate industry after test real estate 
firm which involve acquires land  
Fogh (2009) 
 
 not statistical significant found during 
booming and recession period 
Ting (2007)a (0, 0) Not significant on announcement date 
but there are significant pre- and post-
announcement ARs. 
 
a     Denote studies which differentiated buoyant and recession economic conditions. 
 
 
  Only two divestiture studies were conducted under distinct 
economic conditions and both had contrasting results.6-7 The 
responder are significantly positive during buoyant period and 
significantly negative throughout recession period.4 In contrast, 
the sell-offs announcements result in positive AR during recession 
period such induce larger wealth taking than those found during 
economic burst.6 
The acquisition announcement during recession are generally no 
significant AR on acquisition announcements within recession 
period.10-11 
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3.0  METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is conducted using event study to determine any AR 
surrounding real estate divestiture and acquisition announcements. 
The event study is competent in assessing the effect of various 
singular events.12 This method is comprehensively used as tool to 
calculate consistent and valid outcome of any signals in depicting 
management’s outlook opportunity.13 
  The event window is defined as the no. of days surrounding 
the announcement date (day 0). The event window used in this 
study consists of 21days which begins 10 days prior to 
announcement up to 10 days after (-10days to +10days) to capture 
both leak and/or lag effects. 
  The estimation window is the specific period of time used as 
proxy for normal return. The length of estimation window used in 
this study is 120 days (i.e. day -130 to day -11) prior to event 
window.  The AR is the actual return of company subtracts actual 
return of Bursa Malaysia FTSE Index throughout the estimate 
period and event window. This is based on the Market-Adjusted 
Return Model. 
  The share prices are obtained from DataStream and the daily 
closing share prices must be accessible, but not less than 130 
trading days prior to announcement until 10 trading days after. 
The samples are announced D&A activities within 1 October 
2008 to 30 September 2009 from publicly listed non-real estate 
companies during the Malaysia economic recession. In addition, 
the transactions are only paid by cash-based. The D&A 
announcement dates were identified from company 
announcements on Bursa Malaysia. 
 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  ,  (1) 
where,  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
,           (2)   𝑅𝑚,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡−𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑚 ,𝑡−1
  ,   (3)
  
εi,t are normal return or abnormal return; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  are the actual return 
of i company at t day, where Pi,t are share price for i company at t 
day and  Pi, t-1 are share price of i company a day before t day; and 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 are actual market return, Bursa Malaysia FTSE Index, where 
Pm,t are share price of market, m at t day and Pm, t-1 are share price 
of market, m a day before t day. 
  Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) can define 
the strength of market adjustment in response to the new 
information signal attained from the company-related 
announcement.14 The computation of average abnormal return 
(AAR) of CAAR for window period from -10 day to +10 day are 
reckon as following:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑎,𝑏 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑡 ,
𝑡=𝑏
𝑡=𝑎   (4) 
 
where, 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  
∑ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 ,  (5) 
 
CARa,b,  = cumulative average abnormal return in an event 
window from day a until day b.  
AARt = average abnormal returns on day t 
 
  The significance of AAR is tested using t-test while 
verification on time series abnormal return tested using paired-
sample t-test. 
  The hypothesis for this study is: 
 
H0: no AR from D&A announcement within the event window. 
H1: AR from D&A announcement within the event window. 
 
4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  Descriptive Analysis 
 
From the data compounded, there are 35 and 40 announcements 
for divestitures and acquisitions of non-real estate companies 
respectively. The breakdown of announcements as specified by 
sectors is shown in Table 2 below.   
 
Table 2  Numbers of property divested and acquired according to sectors 
 
Sectors 
Number Real Estates of 
Announcements 
Divestiture Acquisition 
Construction 2 - 
Consumer 8 8 
Finance 2 - 
Industrial Product 14 16 
Plantation 1 3 
Trading Services 5 13 
Technology 3 - 
Total 35 40 
 
Table 3  Types of property divested and acquired 
 
Types of Property 
Number of Companies 
Divestiture Acquisition 
Vacant Land 17 19 
Land Together with 
Buildings 
9 7 
Office Building 4 5 
Factory 1 2 
Others 4 7 
Total 35 40 
 
 
  The type of properties divested and acquired within the 
recession period from fourth quarter in year 2008 to third quarter 
in year 2009 for listed non-real estate companies are tabulated in 
Table 3 as follows. According to the table, the most ordinary type 
of property divested and acquired is vacant land. 
 
4.1  Data Analysis 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the AARs and CAARs for divestiture 
companies within the 120-days estimation window. AARs 
fluctuated randomly and were no constant except CAARs as a 
whole comprise negatives values. The market is viewed as 
unfavorably to any potential leakage of information during the 
estimation window.   
 
 
 
Figure 1  The AARs and CAARs in 120 days estimation window for 
divestiture   
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Figure 2  The AARs and CAARs in 120 days estimation window for 
acquisition 
 
 
  Figure 2 shows the AARs and CAARs for acquiring 
companies within 120 days estimation window. The AARs in the 
graph illustrates unsystematic fluctuation and on the contrary, 
overall CAARs had positive values and were raising though the 
estimation window. This movement possibly sourced by positive 
response towards leakage of acquisition announcements that 
disagrees from divestiture announcements. The CAAR contradicts 
earlier results on the divestiture sample.  
  
 
 
Figure 3  Divestitures: The AARs and CAARs in event window (-10days 
to +10days) 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Acquisitions: The AARs and CAARs in event window (-
10days to +10days) 
 
 
  Based on Figure 3, share prices from day -8 to day -2 
demonstrated negative AARs. Meanwhile, share price were 
positive on day -1 until day 2 and the specify AARs were 0.02%, 
2.92%, 0.47% and 0.61%. These negative and consequent strong 
positive market reactions specify that bad and good information 
concerning acquisitions may perhaps leaked into the market. 
CAARs as whole had encountered both negative and positive 
value throughout the event window. Surrounding the acquisition 
date, the CAAR from day -2 to day 2 indicated positive AR. 
Whereas, CAAR fall-offs from then on until day 10. 
  Figure 4 shows share prices of divesting companies 
experienced negative AARs from day -4 to day -1. However 
positive AAR was shown on day 0 until day 2. CAAR was overall 
negative from day -3 up to day 6 of the divestiture. Hence, the 
investors seem to react positively to acquisition and negatively to 
divestitures during the financial crisis. 
 
4.3  Significance Tests of Abnormal Return 
 
4.3.1  T-Test on AARs Values 
 
The t-test and significant level of AARs are analyzed using One 
Sample t-test as shown in Table 4. On the announcement day, 
majority divesting companies have exploited improved share 
prices. Nonetheless, only certain AARs on day -3, day 7, day 8 
and day 9 are significant at 0.1 level, and day 2 significant at 0.01 
level.  
  Most of the calculated AARs are not statistical significant at 
any levels, reasonably affected by the relatively large standard 
deviation of the sample. This is because the greater the value of 
the standard deviation, the more spread out or dispersed a data set 
is expected to be. The standard deviation of the sample might be 
reduced by involving additional companies in the analysis.  
  On day 0, the AARs are positive but not significant for both 
D&A. Acquisition announcements are preceded with significant 
positive AAR on day -1 while divestiture announcements have 
significant negative AAR on day -3. Post-announcement results 
show significant negative abnormal returns for both D&A 
announcements in day 2 for divestiture and days 3 and 4 for 
acquisitions.  
 
4.4  T-Test on CARs Values 
 
4.4.1  T-Test on Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Over Selected Window Intervals 
 
Table 5 shows the dissimilarity in AR under the event window, 
figured using paired t-test. Significant changes for divestiture are 
negative post-announcement in (+1,+2) and (0,+2). The probable 
rationale may be caused by discharged of further information into 
the market to the public after the announcement date.15 The 
investors continuously monitor and evaluate the disposal and 
acquisition property information that spread out into the market 
over time.   
  Similarly, significant changes for acquisition are negative 
pre-announcement (-8,-6), (-7,-3) and (-2, -1). However, the 
CAAR became significantly positive circulate the announcement 
date (-2,-1). CAAR surrounding announcement date for 
acquisitions (-2,+2) are all positive. 
  Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were 
calculated over day -1 to +1 to encapsulate the share price effects 
of the divestiture announcements after announcement day.16 This 
is to cater for all companies that announced D&A activities after 
trading closed on event date or any leakage of information prior to 
the announcement. Within day -1 to day 1, there is no significant 
CAAR of 0.0054 and 0.0107 respectively for divestiture and 
acquisition announcements. 
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Table 4  T-test on AARs values during the event window for divestitures and acquisitions 
 
Day 
Divestiture Acquisition 
AARs 
Standard 
Deviation, St 
p-value AARs 
Standard 
Deviation, St 
p-value 
-10 -0.002237 0.046620 -0.284  0.001071 0.026866 0.252  
-9 0.000447 0.024105 0.110  0.006647 0.032780 1.283  
-8 0.007758 0.080986 0.567  -0.002826 0.046719 -0.383  
-7 0.004450 0.036842 0.715  -0.000863 0.025103 -0.217  
-6 0.005161 0.066022 0.462  -0.013817 0.037238 -2.353 ** 
-5 -0.011350 0.048861 -1.374  -0.001413 0.043485 -0.206  
-4 -0.007441 0.059376 -0.741  -0.004375 0.033922 -1.207  
-3 -0.009740 0.030896 -1.865 * -0.001576 0.054957 -0.181  
-2 -0.002527 0.053858 -0.278  0.000171 0.047539 0.023  
-1 0.006903 0.056736 0.720  0.029177 0.104327 1.769 * 
0 0.002833 0.056009 0.299  0.004663 0.059463 0.496  
1 0.002592 0.041774 0.367  0.006052 0.028912 1.324  
2 -0.022894 0.043198 -3.135 *** 0.006318 0.041077 0.973  
3 0.010432 0.053501 1.154  -0.012390 0.038257 -2.048 ** 
4 0.003421 0.056335 0.359  -0.007782 0.024735 -1.990 * 
5 -0.001860 0.076941 -0.143  0.002165 0.055671 0.144  
6 0.017679 0.083303 1.256  -0.002156 0.027745 -0.491  
7 0.009540 0.028567 1.976 * -0.011050 0.041913 -1.667  
8 -0.014336 0.044861 -1.891 * 0.002170 0.032670 0.420  
9 -0.012369 0.038435 -1.904 * 0.002251 0.029850 0.477  
10 0.004070 0.034658 0.695  -0.005883 0.036678 -1.015  
 
Note: p < 0.1 = *, p < 0.05 = ** and p < 0.01 = *** with 2 tail statistical significant. 
 
 
Table 5  Test of significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAARs) for D&A announcement over different cumulative periods 
 
Divestiture Acquisition 
Period(a,b) 𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒂,𝒃 t-test Period(a,b) 𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒂,𝒃 t-test 
(-10,-4) -0.001 -0.070  (-10, -8)  0.004  0.387  
(-8,-6)  0.010  0.835  (-8, -6) -0.015 -2.536 ** 
(-4,-2) -0.012 -1.252  (-7, -3) -0.021 -1.908 * 
(-2,-1)  0.007  0.720  (-2, -1)  0.029  1.769 * 
(-1,+1)  0.005  0.449  (-1, +1)  0.011  1.058  
(+1,+2) -0.023 -3.135 *** (0, +2)  0.012  1.656  
(0,+2) -0.203 -2.118 ** (+1,+2)  0.006  0.973  
(+3, +6)  0.192  1.156  (+2, +4) -0.020 -3.099 *** 
(+7,+10) -0.023 -2.338 ** (+5, +7) -0.013 -1.650  
(+8, +10) -0.004 -0.490  (+8, +10) -0.004 -0.490  
 
Note: p < 0.1 = *, p < 0.05 = ** and p < 0.01 = *** with 2 tail statistical significant. 
 
 
5.0  DISCUSSION AND LIMITAATIONS 
 
The results of AARs surrounding divestiture and acquisition 
announcement dates (-1,0,+1) are not significant at any levels. 
However, the result differs from previous studies shows that share 
prices of divesting companies will sustain a positive abnormal 
return on the date of the announcement of the divestiture, even 
during the period of worldwide financial catastrophe.6,8 
  Moreover, the outcome of acquisition and divestitures of 
CAARs (-1, +1) is not significant. The CAAR (-1, +1) was found 
coherent with several previous studies.1,17,11 The results exemplify 
that there is no significant abnormal return for acquisition and 
divestiture announcements. However, studies during economic 
growth from the UK and US confirm positive abnormal returns 
for divestiture announcement. Also, pervious discovered 
significant positive reaction to Malaysia property acquisition 
announcement for the period of economic burst.11 As a result, the 
economic condition at the time of announcement initiate 
significant in influencing wealth return in terms of AR.
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Table 6  Companies divested property under valuation or net book value 
 
Companies Disposal Price 
(RM) 
Valuation 
(RM) 
Latest Net Book Value 
(RM) 
Loss* 
(RM) 
Ho Wah Genting Bhd 7,000,000 7,500,000 8,409,942 500,000 
Tracoma Holdings Bhd 7,800,000 - 8,547,000 747,000 
Rhythm Consolidated Bhd 7,000,000 - 8,011,641 1,011,641 
Sarawak Concrete Industries 20,000,000 22,000,000 - 2,000,000 
Woodlandor Holdings Bhd 3,000,000 3,400,000 2,447,936 400,000 
FSBM Holdings Berhad 4,154,726 4,400,000 - 245,274 
PMB Technology Bhd 5,071,429 - 5,123,369 51,940 
 
* Loss is calculated by Valuation minus Disposal price. When the valuation is not available, we use the net book value. 
 
 
  Divestiture results showed weak positive AR on 
announcement day and CAARs (+1, +2) and (+0, +2) that are 
negative and significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, correspondingly. 
The dissimilarity possibly explained by the financial wellbeing of 
divesting companies in the sample.6 This study contained 35 
divesting companies, where 20% appear to be distressed 
companies. These companies disposed their properties at prices 
lower than valuation and/or latest net book value, as shown in 
Table 6. Hence, these companies confront with financial distress 
where it requires to immediately carrying out financially 
motivated divestitures. Even though most of companies divested 
at premium prices, the market does not exerted to observe 
divestitures favorably.  
 
 
Table 7  Companies acquired property under valuation or net book value 
 
Companies Acquisition Price (RM) Valuation (RM) Gain* (RM) 
HiapTeck Venture Berhad 71.0 million 73.0 million 2million 
Parkson Holding Berhad 84.04 million 104.4 million 20.36mil 
Sitt Tatt Berhad 70.0 million 91.9 million 21.9million 
Lii Hen Industries Bhd 4,800,000.00 2,580,000/-and 2,850,000/- 
respectively 
630,000 
Advance Synergy Berhad 26.78 million 
(5,450,000 euro) 
5,600,000euro 150,000euro 
Concrete Engineering Products 
Berhad 
4,500,000.00 4,750,000 250,000 
Spritzer Bhd 32.50 million 37,000,000. 4.5million 
 
* Gain is calculated by Valuation minus Purchasing / Acquire price. When the valuation is not available, we use the net book value 
 
  In the acquisition sample, the aftermaths show significant 
positive return prior to and significant negative return 
subsequent to announcement day. The preliminary favorable 
response from market investor signifies the presence of leakage 
of information regarding potential acquisitions. This proves that 
the market views information on acquisitions favorably as 
positive events that can increase company wealth. The 
subsequent negative return possibly caused by market insight 
that the acquisitions were overrated in value. From the total 
acquisition sample of 40 companies, only 7 companies paid 
prices lower than valuation and/or initial acquired value. This is 
presented in Table 7 above. The remaining 33 companies 
(approximately 82%) might have overrated their capacity to 
extort value of acquired properties. Consequently, the acquirers 
have paid a premium over valuation for these acquisitions, 
which consecutively are not favored by the market. 
  This study faced a limitation of smaller size of 35 
divestiture and 40 acquisition companies due to the recession 
time span. The study limitation on rather small number of sellers 
useable for analysis and the observed evidence had shown a 
weak positive market response simultaneously. 
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
The results prove that both divestiture and acquisition 
announcements lead positive insignificant AR on and near 
announcement date (-1 to +1). Pre-announcement results explain 
that divesting (acquiring) companies turn out negative (positive) 
abnormal return, signifying that any possible leakage of 
information on divestiture (acquisition) is not favored (favored) 
by the market. The results contravene studies carried out within 
economic burst, signifying that the elemental economic 
condition is particularly considerable in determining market 
reaction towards D&A activities. 
  Subsequent to announcement, results prove that divesting 
companies keep on encountering negative AR after 
announcements albeit most of similar companies divested at 
premium prices.  The results are opposite for acquiring 
companies that subsequently encountering significant and 
negative abnormal return instead. This is credibly due to 
approximately 82% of acquiring companies paid a premium 
above valuation for the real estate assets. 
  This study documents that in an economic decline, the 
market detracts upon divestitures in general and acquisitions of 
real estate assets exceeding their valuations.   
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